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ABSTRACT
Wall Street has begun to devise construction lending programs, thus providing public
capital to a historically private market. At issue is the potentially dangerous prospect
that these firms will ignore the lessons learned by their predecessors, creating a new
risk of financing speculative overbuilding and increasing volatility in the commercial
real estate markets.
Three prominent Wall Street firms provided details of their lending programs, and are
the subject of the case studies performed to determine how those charged with funding
development with public capital view their roles and the financial products they
provide. The programs are compared and contrasted with one another, along with a
comparison to "ideal" academic benchmarks. An analyses of the professional and
academic literature is presented to highlight the intricacies of construction lending.
The results of this research are cause for potential concern. Only one of the three firms
has established a program which addresses the possible repercussions of moral hazard
and mis-alignment of incentives. The potential for the other two programs to provide
developers with unrestrained access to capital could very well create an overbuilding
situation similar to the 1980's debacle. This suggests that we may well see another
round of development that oversteps the demand equilibrium, and exasperates the
volatility of real estate values during the next inevitable economic recession.
Thesis Supervisor: Timothy J. Riddiough
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to thank Kristina for her patience and support.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A B ST R A C T ...................................................................................................... 
.2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...................................................3
TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................4
INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 5
Thesis Structure.........................................................7
Conclusions ............................................................ 7
LITERATURE REVIEW - WHAT DOES THE LITERATURE SAY? ................... 9
Reputation ............................................................ 11
Monitoring..................................................................................... 14
Moral Hazard .......................................................... 16
Relationship Lending....................................................19
Informed vs. Arm's-Length Lending.........................................20
Liquidity and Leverage...................................................21
Competitive Screening.........................2
ti e S r g. ................... ............................................................................ 23
CASE I - FIRM A ......................................................... 27
Construction Lending Program.............................................27
Strategic Decisions......................................................29
Source of Funds........................................................30
Issues Relating to Literature Review ...................................................................... 30
Summary of Firm A.....................................................31
CASE II - FIRM B ......................................................... 33
Construction Lending Program......................................................................... 33
Strategic Decisions......................................................36
Source of Funds........................................................36
Issues Relating to Literature Review..........................................36
Compare and Contrast with Firm A..........................................38
CASE III - FIRM C........................................................40
Construction Lending Program.............................................40
Strategic Decisions......................................................43
Source of Funds........................................................44
Issues Relating to Literature Review..........................................44
Compare and Contrast with Firms A and B.........................................................45
FINANCING ALTERNATIVES WHEN DEBT GETS TOO RESTRICTIVE ........... 48
Opportunity Funds .............................................................................. 48
Internal Financing......................................................49
Synthetic Leases........................................................49
Im plications................ ...................................................................................................... 51
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 52
REFERE N CE S .. ...................................................................................................... 55
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The cyclical nature of commercial real estate development is well-established. The process of
turning a conceptual idea into tenanted bricks and mortar is a very involved and time
consuming endeavor, where a typical large scale office project can take three years to progress
through design, approval and construction. While demand forecasts are now generally reliable,
supply has been the destabilizing force which has exasperated this volatile market. The market's
lag in recognizing supply and demand equilibrium may be inevitable, but it is the severity of
these cycles that most concerns real estate professionals. This thesis examines the role of public
debt capital in construction financing to explore the question: Will Wall Street provide "Smart
Money" to developers seeking construction financing, or will they fuel overdevelopment in the
next cycle? Overbuilding caused severe repercussions in the 1980s, and while the circumstances
are now different, the similarities are significant enough to warrant further investigation.
Risked based pricing is certainly nothing new to Wall Street; indeed, it has been one of their
strategic advantages over other real estate market participants. However, the reliance on
relationships, reputation and monitoring in traditional construction lending, as opposed to Wall
Street's use of arm's-length financing of assets, is an area ripe for examination. The causes
behind our last building cycle are well documented; deregulation, inappropriate tax incentives
and mis-matched capital all contributed to reduce capitalization rates and inflated prices. While
these same factors are not evident today, the market is again awash in capital and concerns
persist that we could be faced with another stagnating round of speculative overdevelopment.
Many indicators suggest that this time around there is less to worry about, thanks to traditional
lenders adhering to risk-based capital rules which do not allow for excessive amounts of
leverage or speculative building. However, public debt and equity capital have the potential to
provide even greater access to capital for developers than those failed institutions of the past.
The public equity provided by REITs, for example, while almost non-existent only a decade ago
now accounts for 22% of the total equity invested in institutional real estate.' Public debt,
primarily in the form of commercial mortgage backed securities, has also seen a tremendous
increase in volume; though it remains to be seen if the public markets venture into financing
development will be as well received as their financing of existing properties has been.
Construction lending is vastly different in many regards to all other real estate financing. Since
the project's viability depends on completion of the building, lenders have historically taken a
very active role in building relationships, screening out poorly conceived ideas and monitoring
developers through the development process. Adherence to the construction schedule is vital,
with the collateral being unable to generate cash flow to support the end loan until such time as
tenant leases provide a stable income. Due to the uncertainty of success and borrower's
exposure to moral hazard, informed lenders have traditionally dominated arm's-length providers
of construction finance. In addition to concerns over adverse selections impact on the quality
of borrowers seeking public over private financing, Wall Street's motivation to monitor, and
willingness to "pull the plug" on a project gone awry, must also be understood to examine how
their objective of obtaining securitizable loans affects continuation decisions on risky projects.
Now that real estate and Wall Street have found each other, Wall Street is attempting to give real
estate investors the ability to buy and sell real estate as easily as stocks and bonds. The three
firms which are the subject of case studies in this thesis each began their lending programs with
a similar focus: creating more product for securitization. The similarities end there, however.
The individual programs range from utilizing construction financing simply as a tool to obtain
additional CMBS product, to a full fledged relationship program designed to enhance existing
business lines and bolster the firms perception in the market.
1 Equitable Real Estate Investment Management, Inc., "Emerging Trends in Real Estate: 1997," as of 6/30/96
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Thesis Structure
This thesis first addresses the above issues in Chapter 2 by examining relevant professional and
academic literature relating to reputation, monitoring, moral hazard, relationships, informed
verses arm's-length lending, liquidity, leverage and finally competitive screening. By applying
these papers to the issues at hand, a clear picture emerges as to how the execution of
construction financing differs between local players and Wall Street. The inherent perils are
discussed as applies to the field of construction lending, and solutions to these issues are
presented.
In chapters three through five, I present three case studies of prominent Wall Street investment
banks to examine the current practice of providing public debt capital for construction
financing. The individual firm's lending programs are compared and contrasted with each other
and the available literature to seek out answers to our question of how appropriate is Wall
Street's involvement in construction financing. In chapter six, I look at the alternatives available
to developers. Internal equity financing, opportunistic funds and synthetic leases effectively
provide development capital when debt becomes too restrictive, and also effects the pool of
potential borrowers seeking public debt capital. Finally, in chapter seven, I draw conclusions on
the ability of Wall Street to effectively compete in construction lending; reviewing the perils of
informed verses arm's-length debt, moral hazard and reputation building in a traditionally
informational intensive business.
Conclusions
The recovery in the real estate markets has stimulated investment activity across the investment
spectrum. With continued economic growth and depreciation of the existing building stock,
new development will continue to play an important role in meeting the needs of business. The
questions addressed in this thesis are important because the severity and depth of our seemingly
inevitable development cycles in commercial real estate greatly affect the US economy. By
understanding Wall Street's involvement in construction, we can begin to understand whether
our next wave of development will be a reenactment of the 1980's fiasco.
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The three cases bring to light the very different approaches being advanced by Wall Street's
leading firms. Firm A, a relative newcomer to the business, has developed what closely
resembles a model lending program, complete with monitoring and informed lending;
remaining very aware of the importance of relationships and reputation to successful lending.
Firm B has created a variation of portfolio finance which provides construction lending to
operators of franchise hotels, while retaining recourse against the franchiser. This provides
Firm B with a strong credit enhancement to support the individual loans, but does little to
match development with demand. Instead, they rely on the franchiser to provide due diligence
prior to providing their guaranty. Firm C has simply created a vehicle to create additional end
loans for securitization. Their reliance on diversification through numerous transactions,
coupled with a CMBS exit strategy, raises serious concerns over how they can provide influence
to keep developers from straying into riskier projects or continuing ill-fated projects.
It appears that Wall Street's presence can reduce the volatility of the real estate cycles, as some
anecdotal evidence of this has already been found in the Southwest apartment sectors. There,
the importance of public capital in the development of this product was clear, constraining a
slight overbuilding boom and keeping it from becoming more severe. As the various methods
of entrance into construction financing are proved out, I believe that Wall Street will adopt the
best risk/return scenario and provide the real estate industry with a stabilizing force. However,
until firms such as Firm B and C amend their programs to reflect the established benchmarks,
accepting more responsibility for the projects being created by their issuance of capital, there
exists a real danger that speculative construction will create another unnecessarily severe boom
and bust cycle in the commercial real estate markets. It is inevitable that some level of over- or
under-building will be present at a given time, however, lending programs which do not adhere
to established and proved lending techniques will only accentuate these cycles, creating
instability in the overall real estate market.
Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW - WHAT DOES THE LITERATURE SAY?
The objective of this chapter is to examine the relevant literature from both industry
professionals and academic leaders to apply the lessons learned from previous research to
construction lending, particularly as to how it relates to Wall Street's incursion into the
construction finance arena. The case studies illustrate Wall Street's attempt to create a
construction lending program, and the diverse methods employed in obtaining that goal. The
following literature provides perspective on the primary concerns and methods of avoiding
known perils, relating to borrower/lender relationships. Since construction lending has
historically been a relationship driven venture, with borrower reputation and informed lenders
the critical ingredients for successful performance, understanding the literature is especially
important. In addition, to truly succeed, Wall Street will ultimately need to create a financing
vehicle which further provides restraint against overbuilding, and brings stabilization to the real
estate market.
Arm's-length relationships, inherent moral hazard and borrower monitoring are issues which
Wall Street will need to address in order to be an effective leader in construction lending.
Arm's-length lending, where a lender and borrower are physically or contractually separated, has
traditionally not provided the flexibility conducive to optimizing construction financing. While
commercial banks have been able to make flexible financial decisions which prevent a project
from going awry, arm's-length lending is typically much stricter in its interpretation of loan
documents, and severely limited in its ability obtain information required to control an owner's
actions to keep the project ongoing only if it remains profitable. Arm's-length lenders seldom
have control over a developer's continuation decision as a project progresses. Regardless of
changing risk and profitability profile, arm's-length lenders are removed from the development
process and do not have access to the informed private information held by the borrower.
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Construction lending has typically been a very localized activity, requiring constant monitoring
by the lender of details not publicly available. Wall Street's incentive to act as an informed
lender rather than an arm's-length lender is not clear, and will likely not be nearly as pronounced
as a local bank. One of the case study firms actually utilizes massive volume to diversify risk
and retains the exit strategy of removing the risk from their books by securitizing the completed
project long before market cycles prove out the wisdom of the project. This approach does
little to minimize potential overbuilding or provide incentive to developers to avoid high risk
projects.
Moral hazards for developers abound in selecting real estate construction projects. Less
established developers have a high incentive to choose risky projects with high returns over safe
projects with lower returns. This hazard also increases in situations of financial distress, since in
both situations the developer has much less to lose than they stand to gain in the event of a
successful conclusion. By treating real estate debt as a commodity, will Wall Street provide the
monitoring required to limit a developers ability to enter into riskier projects than would
otherwise be allowed by local informed lenders? Without the regulatory constraints of
commercial banks, the danger of speculative development being financed by Wall Street,
without a full understanding of the true risk return profile of the particular project, increases
substantially.
Adverse selection, or a "lemon's problem," also plagues lenders competing to underwrite the
most development deals. While borrower reputation has been shown to be an effective gauge
in the selection of optimal competing projects, bank relationships remain very important to
developers. Therefore, a developers incentive to look outside their local area for financing, if
not solely based on pricing or take out commitments, is suspect. Wall Street was once viewed as
a lender for second tier borrowers, those with projects not quite attractive enough to entice their
local banker. This perception is changing as yields fall and Wall Street is able to become more
price competitive with banks on individual loan terms, no longer relegated to losing the best
deals for lack of pricing competitiveness. To advertise themselves to developers, Wall Street
largely relies on local mortgage brokers, another fee oriented group, who are being asked to
provide greater initial due-diligence work on the loans. This adds yet another layer between
Wall Street and the borrower, magnifying exposure to arm's-length lending issues. Depending
on the particular firm's strategy, local banks are either direct competitors or partners in
obtaining new deals, apparently willing to share their best customers with Wall Street in order to
maintain these new relationships and access the public market's capital. The sensibility of
dependence on these inter-lender arrangements will be established in the next market downturn.
Reputation
In the field of real estate construction, the acquisition of a good reputation is essential for
developers to differentiate themselves and thereby obtain favorable treatment from lenders. In
Diamond (1989)2, an analysis of incentive problems in debt markets shows that they will be
most severe in early periods when new firms have short track records. New developers
provided with easy access to capital are more likely to select risky projects than safe projects,
basically rolling the dice for the higher returns when they have not yet acquired a good
reputation to lose. With sufficiently widespread adverse selection, the initial pool of borrowers
will be of low average quality and the interest rates for borrowers with short track records will
be high. Therefore, while the capital will be properly priced to account for the risk, optimal
usage of this capital is not obtained. As a result, the present value of future rents from
establishing a good reputation will start out very low, causing borrowers with limited experience
but with a choice of projects to choose the short-run optimum, a risky low-value project. A
small portion of those who select the risky project will be successful, and able to continually
repay their loans, achieving a good reputation. As a borrower achieves a good reputation, he
can borrow at lower interest rates, and the present value of future income from a good
reputation rises. Eventually, this projected future income becomes high enough for the
borrower to switch to the long-run optimum, the safe high-value project, for an arbitrarily large
number of periods until, in Diamond's experiment, the endgame occurs. In practical
2 D Diamond, Journal of Political Economy "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," 1989
11
experience, borrowers will initially tend to choose risky projects to receive higher profits,
moving to lower risk projects when they acquire a reputation for success which allows them to
borrow at advantageous rates. The immediate issue, however, is that only if there is little
adverse selection, will reputation instead work to immediately provide incentives to new
borrowers. Therefore, Wall Street will be well advised to create a program in which they are not
the lender of last resort, instead competing with local lenders for the most desirable projects.
Diamond's model specifies reputation in terms of credit rating, which is public information. If
project choices are directly observable, then unless there are incentives in the first period to take
an action that is beneficial to one's reputation, there is never any incentive to take that action. It
follows, then, that if borrowers are not required to maintain good reputations to obtain credit,
they do not have proper incentive to avoid continuing to take on risky projects over safe
projects, even when the safe project may provide adequate returns to continue in business. This
is particularly relevant in situations where arm's-length lending is relied upon. Again, in
Diamond's model, once observed selecting a risky project, a borrower can never credibly claim
to be of the type which selects only one safe project each period. The existence of significant
adverse selection is important because otherwise incentive effects of a reputation would be near
its maximal value in the initial period. As it is, continued success in development leads to a firm
choosing safer projects over time to maintain their long acquired reputation.
In Diamond's model, borrowing would begin at essentially the riskless rate of interest, while in a
more general setting, for example a market for goods or services of unobservable quality, if
there is significant adverse selection, the market will have low expectations of initial quality, and
the market will not pay very high prices for the output of agents without a long record. This
implies that borrowers with short track records will have a low initial present value of rents in
the future, and those with a choice will supply low quality. Only with an acquired good record,
will there be a large enough present value of rents in the future from maintaining a good
reputation by providing high quality to avoid providing low quality. Developers who have
established good reputations are then highly likely to continue to select high quality projects,
avoiding unnecessary risks of default which accompany projects associated with developers who
have not acquired good reputations. Selecting developers with good reputations can lessen the
likelihood of adverse selection.
Diamond's model has direct applications to examinations of new project acceptance decisions:
firms with certain reputations will turn down a given profitable project that others would accept.
This can be interpreted as a well-defined cost of capital that is firm specific rather than project
specific, because of the private information firms have about project decisions lending to firms
with good reputations becomes much safer. In addition, Diamond's model can be used to
explain, on the basis of public information, some determinants of firms choosing to borrow
through financial intermediaries to access their delegated monitoring services (Diamond 1988).
If the intermediary can help control project decisions, then Diamond's model suggests that
firms with short histories will do their reputation acquisition by borrowing from intermediaries.
The cost of such monitoring is accepted by the developers to enable them to acquire the good
reputation which will allow them to borrow directly in the open market once they have
established long-standing high credit ratings. Wall Street can add value and increase
competitiveness simply by acting as informed lenders, monitoring the developers.
A study performed by Neral and Ochs (1992)3 found that the hallmark of reputation building is
the willingness of an individual to give up short term benefits in order to try to favorably
influence the course of a long-term relationship. Their sequential equilibrium model of
reputation building predicts that a "little bit" of uncertainty will induce rational players to
develop a mutually profitable long-term, but finite, relationship even if one party would have a
strong incentive to take advantage of the other in the end. They observed behavior consistent
with the predictions of sequential equilibrium theory. The real power of sequential equilibrium
as a model of reputation building is that it makes strong predictions about how the course of a
relationship will be influenced by the parameters of the game, defining the circumstances under
which the relationship is structured. Neral and Och's results did not support those predicted
3 J. Neral & J. Ochs, Econometrica "The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation Building- A Further Test," September 1992
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from the model. While the theory predicts that a decrease in the payoff from defaulting will, in
the mixed strategy phase, decrease the probability that the lender will extend the loan; it also
predicts that such a change will have no systematic effect on borrower behavior. Their
empirical results were just the opposite. Applied to construction lending, the selection of safe
projects with moderate returns over risky projects with large returns becomes more likely with a
narrowing of the expected spread between these two outcomes. Inversely, as borrowers
encounter distress, they are much more likely to select risky projects. While private information
available to informed lenders would mitigate this activity, arm's-length lenders are exposed to
borrower selection of adverse project risk. Unless a lender stays privately informed about a
borrower's project and overall financial health, in distress it is likely the borrower will attempt to
either continue a project which may be best restructured, or attempt to obtain higher returns by
engaging in riskier projects.
Monitoring
To review the benefits monitoring brings to credit relationships, Diamond (1996)4 provides an
enlightening perspective. His paper clarifies the roles of debt and diversification in banking.
Debt has several roles related to financial intermediation, here he considers the right to liquidate
on default which provides any outside lender with power over the borrower, inducing the
borrower to repay the debt. This power is limited by the borrower's right to repay the debt in
full and remove the lender's liquidation rights. However, liquidation is potentially inefficient,
and Diamond argues that if a lender cannot monitor the borrower's business, then the lender
should liquidate whenever there is a default, no matter what the cause. In some of the reviewed
loan programs, it was noticed that the Firm was very unlikely to liquidate, instead preferring to
complete a project and deal with deficiencies after securitization of the end loan. This is
potentially dangerous, as the borrowers likely are aware of the lenders hesitancy to liquidate and
become more willing to engage in risky behavior.
4 D. Diamond, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, "Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring: A
Simple Example," Summer 1996
This also has serious implications in construction lending, where change orders can be
imperative when conditions necessitate deviating from the original plans. In an arm's-length
situation, without informed lenders who can quickly and efficiently monitor a projects progress,
standardized contracts often do not provide lenders with the discretion to change with the
projects needs. However, if the lender can closely monitor the situation, then the ability to
selectively remove the threat to liquidate in return for a concession from the borrower can
provide power over the borrower without using inefficient liquidation. Financial intermediaries
such as banks can effectively centralize costly monitoring and avoid the duplication of effort of
the monitoring of borrowers by small investors. But without monitoring, a borrower
encounters situations which may not lead toward the safe alternative.
In attempting to understand how contractual monitoring of an arm's-length relationship can be
applied to traditionally localized construction lending, Boyd and Smith (1994)5 examine the
usefulness of standard verses custom contracts. They considered contracts in an idealized world
where contracts can specify a complete set of contingencies, and where there are no difficulties
in implementation or enforcement associated with contractual provisions. They found that
standard debt contracts are not optimal in such a world, at least for any reasonable assumptions
about foreseeable situations. Optimal contracts for lenders require the randomized initiation of
bankruptcy proceedings. The borrower does better when bankruptcy proceedings are initiated,
since optimal contracts specify after default contingencies calling for some degree of debt
forgiveness.
In practice, these contractual features are not observed in actual loan documentation and
therefore may seem odd. Boyd and Smith, to a substantial extent, do not disagree, rather, they
believe that standard debt contracts are "nearly optimal" in an idealized world. Their results
suggest that the gains due to stochastic monitoring are small, at least when reasonable
exogenous parameter values are utilized. Therefore, if there are significant costs or incentive
5 J. Boyd and B. Smith, The Journal of Business "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic verses Nonstochastic
Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," October 1994
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problems associated with randomized monitoring, it is unlikely to be employed. By implication,
Boyd and Smith find welfare gains associated with deviating from standard debt contracts small.
Using standardized construction loan documentation therefore appears to optimize a lenders
position while reducing expenses associated with costly monitoring. While construction lending
may historically have required close scrutiny; with an arm's-length approach, standard contracts
and the threat of immediate exercise of rights provided to lenders under the contracts appears
most effective to deter default in instances of moral hazard situations. Again, Wall Street's
CMIBS exit strategy requires a completed project capable of creating a steady cash flow from
rents. If borrowers are aware that their lender is unlikely to exercise their right to liquidate,
negotiations in times of distress favor the borrower.
Moral Hazard
Another significant paper written by Diamond (1991)6 notes that when real rates increase
relative to future profitability, the future becomes less important and moral hazard becomes
more severe: more borrowers choose to take a chance on ruining their now less valuable
reputation. This has serious implications for construction lenders in times of distress such as
witnessed in the late 1980's. In this paper, Diamond's model predicts that in industries where
moral hazard is sufficiently widespread, new borrowers will begin their reputation acquisition by
being monitored and later switch to issuing directly placed debt. A favorable track record
acquired while being monitored will be useful in predicting future actions without monitoring.
Reputation alone can then eventually deal with the moral hazard because the better reputation
achieved over time implies that adverse selection risk is then less severe. In situations where a
choice between reputable and new borrower's without a reputation exist, the reputable
developer has significantly less incentive to choose a risky project over a safe project, placing the
lenders capital in an advantageous investment.
6 D. Diamond, Journal of Political Economy "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed
Debt," 1991
The borrowers who rely on monitored bank loans are middle-rated borrowers, whose rating is
too low for reputation effects to eliminate moral hazard, but yet high enough for monitoring to
eliminate moral hazard. It would appear that although arm's-length lending would not be
optimal here, the use of local agents to monitor could significantly reduce the threat of a
developer continuing a risky project without the knowledge of the lender. Unfortunately,
monitoring that is effective and cheap may fail to provide incentives to eliminate moral hazard
because it removes the stigma from being known to be subject to moral hazard: future
monitoring can now deal with the moral hazard effectively. In these cases, monitoring can then
destroy its own value because reputation effects work against its effectiveness. In periods of
high or anticipated high future real interest rates or low present or future anticipated
economywide profitability, a higher credit rating is required to borrow without monitoring,
implying that the demand for bank loan monitoring is then again high and that the average new
bank loan goes to a safer, higher-rated customer. While certain Wall Street firms may avoid
closely monitoring borrowers due to the high cost of such activity, it is exactly this cost which
makes monitoring most effective.
Looking at issues of moral hazard in credit markets, Calem (1993)7 found that borrowers may
take risky actions that are not in the best interest of lenders. Moral hazard could entail higher
financing costs, less flexible financing arrangements, or even credit rationing (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). One component working against moral hazard is
reputation. In the long run, borrowers may be deterred from risky behavior that is contrary to
the interests of lenders by the loss of reputation that would accompany their default. Calem's
paper appraises the effectiveness of reputation as a deterrent to moral hazard in credit markets.
Following Diamond (1989), Calem modeled moral hazard as a repeated game between
borrowers and lenders, where a representative borrower may opt to invest in a speculative
project. He extends the Diamond model by incorporating down payments into loan contracts.
7 P. Calem, Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia: Economic Research Department "Borrower Reputation and
Existence of Moral Hazard in Credit Markets," August 1993
This is significant since current lending regulations imposed on commercial banks have
established new risked-based capital rules which make it much more expensive for banks to
make high LTV loans. Calem shows that these new regulations provide strong incentives to
avoid moral hazard in order to maintain reputation. He shows that moral hazard is effectively
abolished if the borrower's percentage down payment each period exceeds the percent by which
the borrower discounts future income. Since an actual firm's capital-to-asset ratios generally
exceed 20 percent, his model suggests that moral hazard in commercial credit markets is tied to
excessive discounting of future income by borrowing firms, that is borrowers would engage in
speculative behavior only if they discount future income to a greater than ordinary degree.
While discounting in excess of twenty percent may be unusual, it is certainly not inconceivable.
For example, excessive discounting may be imposed on a firm by its manager, in cases where
there is separation between ownership and control and where the manager's interests diverge
from those of the owners. Further implications may be more pronounced in common
development situations such as joint ventures, where the developer does not risk similar equity
as the moneyed participants. However, introducing alternative assumptions into the model does
not transform his conclusion that ordinarily, reputation is an effective deterrent against moral
hazard. This leads one to believe that firms offering speculative development financing without
significant equity requirements may be encouraging risky behavior on the part of borrowers.
Current commercial banking risked-based capital regulations deter funding excessive portions of
project costs, though Wall Street is not subject to these regulations and must self monitor their
willingness to accept additional risk from highly leveraged transactions.
Two alternatives are examined. First, he assumes that internal financing is intermittent; i.e.,
borrowers do not post down payments each period. Second, he allows the price of credit to
fluctuate from period to period, due to an adverse selection problem that varies in severity. In
each case, speculative behavior remains tied to a greater-than-ordinary discounting of future
income (this is further explored in the subchapter on liquidity and leverage.) On the other hand,
if borrowers are discounting future income to a greater than ordinary degree, the moral hazard
problem may be less unusual in credit markets where borrower's capital-to-asset ratios fluctuate
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over time, or where there is some randomness with respect to the proportion of risky
borrowers. Cyclical real estate markets and fluctuations in the availability of capital allow both
these situations to have substantial effect on construction.
His study is subject to at least two important limitations; first, he considers only one form of
moral hazard: the choice between speculative and safe investments. Moral hazard in credit
markets may take other forms, as discussed in Myers (1977); for instance, firms may under-
invest, not take on projects, because the benefits would accrue to creditors rather than owners.
Second, in Calem's model, moral hazard is identified with investment in projects having
negative expected present value. If lenders are more risk-averse than borrowers, then there may
be risky projects with positive expected present values that are viewed as undesirable by lenders.
The conflict of interest between the borrower and lender would intensify, and reputation may
not be so effective a deterrent against moral hazard. Developers seeking safe projects, though
deemed risky by lenders, could be incented to accept the project using private information to
justify accepting the moral hazard, overcoming reputation effects.
Relationship Lending
Reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of relationship lending, Berlin (1996)8 uncovered
some interesting lessons about the ways that lending relationships change as conditions facing a
firm change. Where firms have limited financing choices, for example, small firms, relationship
lending generates real benefits. Relationship lending is characterized by close monitoring of the
firm by the bank and contractual flexibility. The possibility of long-term lending relationships
may make it easier for small, risky firms to borrow outside funds, though firms inevitably seek
more diversified funding sources when these become available. A firm's prior relationship with
a bank makes it easier for the firm to gain access to public securities markets, and even when the
firm can issue public securities, bank relationships continue to play a role. For all but the largest
firms, banks still continue to have an informational advantage that markets recognize.
8 M. Berlin, Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia "For Better and For Worse: Three Lending Relationships,"
November-December 1996"
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Diversification of funding sources severely limits bank's willingness to be flexible when firms
enter financial distress, even when firms have only small amounts of public debt. Nonetheless,
a close relationship with a bank increases the likelihood of successful renegotiations when a firm
enters financial distress.
In construction lending, relationships have been a primary determinant in obtaining funding for
new projects. Lenders sought out by local developers could rely on established relationships
and their informational advantages to avoid lemon's problems. Public market arm's-length
providers of debt capital should remain cautious in providing capital to firms which have not
established relationships with providers of informed capital. They should also obtain
monitoring/informed private information and thoroughly research reputation prior to
extending development funding.
Informed vs. Arm's-Length Lending
To compare borrower's choices between informed and arm's-length debt, I refer to Rajan
(1992)9. The main point of his paper is that there is a fundamental trade-off between bank debt
and arm's-length debt. The bank can monitor a firm and control its investment decisions.
However, in the process of doing this, it alters the division of surplus between itself and the
firm. This distorts the firm's incentives, the firm may then prefer credit from arm's-length
sources, which provide neither the benefits of bank debt or the costs. The bank's ability to
control and its ability to influence the division of surplus are linked because they are aspects of
the bank's implicit property rights. He shows how the bank's informational advantage over
outside lenders could confer on it these property rights; he then discusses how borrowing from
multiple sources and appropriately setting priority are ways of circumscribing the bank's ability
to extract surplus, without diminishing its control.
9 R. Rajan, Journal of Finance "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," September 1992
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Rajan's analysis is not restricted to commercial banks, many investment banks have the ability to
acquire information and negotiate with the firms. As firms make repeated issues and some
investment banks act as delegated monitors for a stable set of investors (Bruck, 1988), his
analysis of "bank" finance would apply there too. Rajan discusses some debates (Meerschwam,
1991) about the relative efficiency of a relationship-based banking system (where a firm is
locked into a relationship with one bank) compared to a transactions-based system (where many
banks bid competitively for each transaction that a firm undertakes). The paper suggests that
relationships and transactions reflect two extreme examples of the control-rent trade-off.
Although there has been a movement away from relationships in the 1970s and 1980s in
developed countries, Rajan's analysis suggests each system has its virtues and unidimensional
comparisons are misleading. As a case in point, the deterioration in the credit rating of bank
loan portfolios in the United States and Japan over this period may partly reflect the
deterioration in control that accompanies the movement from a relationship-oriented system to
a transaction-based competitive system.
Rajan's findings are relevant in examining Wall Street's foray into construction lending, since
some Wall Street firms are also following the transition from relationship to transaction based
activity. As commercial banks in the past followed this route, their loan portfolios suffered
significant downgrading, an occurrence traceable to their move from informed to arm's-length
lending.
Liquidity and Leverage
To provide further insight into the consequences of overlending, Shleifer and Vishny's (1992)10
work on liquidation values is examined. They explore what determines liquidation values of
assets, particularly focusing on the potential buyers of assets. The implications of their paper
relate to both reputation and moral hazard, since when there is a narrowing of spreads between
safe and risky projects, as noted in times of general economic downturns, developers have
10 A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, The Journal of Finance "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach,"
September 1992
greater incentive to chose risky projects. It is shown that when a firm in financial distress needs
to sell assets, its industry peers are likely to be experiencing problems themselves, leading to
asset sales at prices below value in best use. This illiquidity makes assets cheap in bad times, and
is a significant private cost of leverage. They use this focus on asset buyers to explain variations
in debt capacity across industries and over the business cycle, as well as the rise in US corporate
leverage in the 1980s. Particularly in real estate, asset liquidity is an important determinant of
the costs of financial distress. Arm's-length construction lenders are particularly exposed to
these risks. Their paper focuses on economy and industry wide determinants of asset liquidity,
with their main conclusions as follows:
Asset liquidation - through an auction or other sale - does not necessarily allocate assets to the
highest value users. As a result, assets with no alternative uses can fetch prices below value in
best use when sold during an industry- or an economy-wide recession, or when industry buyers
are prevented from bidding by regulation. Such fire sales can have substantial private and social
costs, and often require intensive lender involvement.
Optimal debt levels are limited by asset liquidity. For example, even holding cash flow volatility
constant, cyclical and growth assets have lower optimal level of debt finance. Similarly,
conglomerates and multi-division firms have a higher optimal debt level at the same level of
cash flow volatility. Real estate construction loans and permanent financing have very different
optimal debt level, securitizers of debt should recognize these differences and extend credit
rationally. The optimal leverage of a firm depends on the leverage of other firms in its industry.
An industry might have an optimal debt capacity even when its individual firms do not.
Asset liquidity and therefore optimal debt levels change over time. High markets tend to be
liquid markets. Beliefs in high liquidity of assets can be self-fulfilling, though high volatility in
capital availability may affect short term valuations.
Well documented increases in leverage in the 1980s, both by firms involved in corporate control
transactions and by other firms, were attributable at least in part to the liquid market. This
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market was in turn the result of external factors such as relaxed antitrust enforcement and the
influx of foreign buyers as well as of an important self-reinforcing component. The widespread
expectation of future liquidity and debt capacity created current liquidity and debt capacity.
Future variations in capital availability are inevitable, as investors chose between a wide variety
of investment options, pricing assets on future assumptions of capitalization rates is risky.
Competitive Screening
Finally, a borrower's access to private information and their ability to recontract can have
significant impact when construction lending is done as a loss leader for securitization purposes.
Beaudry and Poitevin (1995)" examine the competitive screening which takes place in these
situations. Their paper examines how the possibility of recontracting affects the financing of
projects when an entrepreneur is privately informed about the projects profitability. The main
finding in this paper is that the financing terms depend critically on the market's beliefs about
the project's riskiness, in particular, the amount of equity required of a developer varies with the
market's initial perceptions about the project. When the market is optimistic about a project,
there is a unique equilibrium outcome, but the standard incentive-compatibility constraints are
not binding. Even if the market is very pessimistic about a project's chances of success, there
always exists an equilibrium in which a good project receives sufficient financing, that is, the
market does not collapse due to a Lemons effect. Finally, they found that the developer's
inability to commit not to recontract may be considered correcting in certain situations. A
developer with private knowledge maintains certain advantages over arm's-length lenders, and
will choose to optimize financing by refinancing with another lender should the project prove to
be more successful than originally perceived.
Downs (1996)12 believes that it is doubtful that a full fledged, nationwide commercial real estate
development boom phase will occur within this general business cycle, as had occurred in past
11 P. Beaudry & M. Poitevin, The Review of Economic Studies Limited "Competitive Screening in Financial Markets when Borrowers
can Recontract," 1995
12 A. Downs, National Real Estate Investor "Are we going to build too much space again?"' April 1996
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such cycles in the 1970s and 1980s. He is a proponent of new development, subject to a wide
array of justifying indicators. Nonetheless, Downs believes that even speculative projects are
justifiable with sufficient equity to weather the next inevitable cycle, though he prefers building
projects for sizable tenants with more space than the tenant needs. He also believes that capital
markets overall are well positioned to fund this expansion. Mr. Down's primary concern is that
as long as investment officers get paid to make deals, and starve when they don't, the
temptation to put money out in spite of evidence of increasing overbuilding will be irresistible.
So the rate of commercial construction will expand ever-faster as long as this general expansion
lasts. Implications of this are that competitive screening to select the best projects may not be
selective enough to restrict overdevelopment. Factors outside traditionally accepted venues also
effect the availability of capital and its subsequent production of new facilities.
Article Summary
The lessons exemplified in the preceding articles can easily be incorporated into a model lending
program for a firm wishing to create a prudent loan production plan. Reputation is the
foremost predictor of a developers willingness to avoid risky projects. Since reputation is
acquired over time, developers have little incentive to avoid accepting undue risks prior to
establishing a good reputation, since they have little to lose. Only after the benefits of a good
reputation are realized (lower borrowing costs) do developers place more value on maintaining
that reputation than they do to the possibility of obtaining higher returns through engaging in
risky behavior. This is examined in depth in the Diamond (1989 & 1991), Neral & Ochs (1992)
and Calem (1993) articles. It is apparent that a good developer reputation is vital to successful
lending.
Monitoring of borrowers allows lenders to identify distress immediately, and further allows
lenders to take preemptive actions which may avert costly liquidation. While monitoring is
costly, without monitoring lenders would not be as effective in preventing risky behavior by
developers. Monitoring also reduces the probability developers will be susceptible to moral
hazards. By creating a successful track record, borrowers have more to lose and are again less
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likely to engage in risky behavior. This reduction in perceived benefits of risky actions is further
reduced with significant equity requirements. It is noted however, that moral hazard can persist
even with reputation and significant capital at risk in situations such as where manager's
interests diverge from owners or in cases of extraordinary discounting of future income.
Diamond (1996 and 1991), Boyd & Smith (1994), and Calem (1993) all focus on the benefits of
monitoring and perils of moral hazard. Lenders must perform monitoring to ensure developers
are properly incented to avoid risky behavior and assist developers without premier reputations
to avoid engaging in risky behavior.
Relationship lending is examined in Berlin (1996), and while it is shown that relationships
benefit borrowers, relationships also provide lenders with an informational advantage which
makes it easier to avoid developers who might engage in risky behavior and to work through
financial distress. Informed verses arm's-length lending is examined in Rajan (1992), and this
can be viewed in conjunction with relationship lending, since the lender's informational
advantage over outside lenders in both circumstances provides significant advantages. Liquidity
and leverage (Shleifer & Vishny 1992 and Downs 1996) and competitive screening Beaudry &
Poitevin (1995) provide further insight on optimal lending practices. When lending in a market
which is likely to suffer liquidity crunches throughout the industry, bad times result in increased
illiquidity, thereby making distressed situations more pronounced. Finally, competitive
screening provides a cautionary lesson to those who provide construction lending as a loss
leader when offering a variety of product lines. Regardless of lock-out and yield maintenance
provisions, developers will likely seek out the best financing situations throughout their
ownership of specific assets.
The following table highlights the subjects addressed in each of the above articles, items in bold
(YES) identify primary topics:
.Characteristics Reputation Monitoring Moral Relationship Informed vs. Liquidity Competitive
Hazard Lending Arm's- & Screening
Addressed Le~e~ngth Leverage
Diamond 1989 YES YES YES YES YES NO NO
Neral & Ochs 1992 YES YES YES NO YES YES NO
Diamond 1996 NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Boyd & Smith 1994 NO YES YES NO YES YES NO
Diamond 1991 YES YES YES YES YES NO NO
Calem 1993 YES YES YES YES NO NO NO
Berlin 1996 NO YES YES YES YES NO NO
Rajan 1992 NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Shleifer & Vishny NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
1992
Beaudry & Poitevin NO YES YES YES YES NO YES
1995
Downs 1996 NO YES NO YES YES YES YES
Chapter 3
CASE I - FIRM A
These cases are designed to examine the construction lending programs of U.S. investment
banks, in conjunction with the relevant literature and established prudent lending practices.
Firm A is a full service real estate finance provider, having closed over $1.7 billion of real estate
financing in 1996. They have recently begun to place more emphasis on their real estate lending
lines, and are attempting to build the company's flexibility as a relationship lender. With their
ability to provide construction, bridge and permanent financing, Firm A offers its real estate
clients access to all their capital needs with one institution. This firm has committed the
resources necessary to develop a construction lending program which closely models their
commercial banking parent, and adheres to a substantial portion of the literature presented on
how to create a sustainable, relatively low risk, construction lending department.
Construction Lending Program
Firm A provides a wide array of construction and interim loans for most commercial product
types; including new construction, and interim/bridge loans for property repositioning. Their
current focus under a construction conduit lending program is multi-tenanted office buildings,
build to suit office buildings, apartment or multifamily and super-regional shopping malls.
OFFICE BUILDINGS - Multi-Tenanted
Minimum Debt Service Coverage Ratio: 1.30x (Initial 1.10x may be considered during
construction)
Maximum Loan to Value: 70%
Minimum Equity: 20%
Spreads (over comparable term LIBOR): 175 - 250
Two additional loan products, the Bridge/Interim and the Standby/Forward, are available to
facilitate both acquisition of property for rehabilitation and to provide commitments for longer
term needs. These products are designated for single purpose entities only, with a first
mortgage required for security. Loan amounts range from $1 to $100 million, based upon
minimum debt service coverage ratios of 1.25 and maximum loan to value constraints of 75%.
Interest rates vary for the specific loans: Bridge loans are floating rate instruments based on a
spread ranging from 200 bps to 300 bps over LIBOR, Interim loans are offered on a fixed rate
basis ranging from 190 bps to 325 bps over the comparable US Treasury, Standby and Forward
commitments are priced at a spread ranging from 225 bps to 300 bps over the commensurate
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Loan Size: $5 - $20 million, exceptions will be made on a case-by-case basis.
Loan Term: 1 - 2 years (construction completion plus stabilization, if necessary)
Fees: 1% - 1.5% up front to Firm A; Administrative fee during
construction $1,000 - %1,500 per month
Lien Status: First mortgage only
Recourse: Completion, Payment and Environmental guarantees during
construction period; Completion guarantee may be released upon
completion; Payment and Environmental guarantees remain in place
until loan is repaid
Prepayment: Allowed at any point, subject to breakage costs, if any
Escrow: May be required at lender's determination for real estate taxes and
insurance
Minimum Underwriting Higher of market, actual or 5%
Vacancy:
Minimum Management 5% of Effective Gross Income
Fee:
Tenant Improvement Adjustment to NOI based on loan budget and lease requirements.
and Leasing Escrow or loan holdback may be required at lender's determination
Commissions:
Developer Experienced in product type and geographic area, good reputation
Qualifications: verifiable by bank references
Guarantor Liquid Assets 20% of Net Worth; Net Worth at least 50% of loan
Requirements: amount
US Treasuries On all the loans, borrowers may lock in the interest rate at a fixed level as
follows: (i) the borrower may purchase a hedge on the entire loan amount by entering into a
rate lock agreement with Firm A, (ii) three days prior to the funding of the permanent, provided
all conditions to the permanent loan funding have occurred, (iii) on the Bridge/Interim, Firm A
can fully fund the permanent loan, but hold back an amount which will be disbursed during the
Bridge loan period according to the DSCR and LTV parameters, or on the Standby/Forward,
by fully funding the loan into a construction reserve account from which Firm A will disburse
the proceeds for construction.
Loan terms vary from six to thirty-six months for the Bridge loan (typically interest only
balloon), to seven to ten years for the other facilities (maximum thirty year amortization
schedule.) Fees are 1% - 2%, no subordinate financing is allowed. Recourse for the Bridge loan
is determined on a case-by-case basis, and is based on a percentage of the outstanding balance.
The other three instruments are non-recourse except for fraud, environmental and material
misrepresentations. Prepayment provisions vary between the products; Bridge loans allow
prepayment in whole or in part at par plus accrued interest with thirty days written notice,
Interim loan terms include lockout and defeasance provisions, Standby/Forward loans are
locked-out for the first three years, followed by the option to defease for the remainder of the
term, open to prepayment at par for the last 180 days of the loan term. In addition, the
Standby/Forward commitment is assumable, subject to lender approval and a 1% fee.
Strategic Decisions
Firm A has made a strategic decision to attempt to meet all of the perceived real estate financing
needs of their clients. Firm A attempts to capitalize on their clients desire for flexible loan
structures in order to maximize the value of an owner's project. They believe that by providing
the capital structure which reflects the assets needs, together with competitive pricing and term,
they can create a competitive advantage over other commercial and investment banks. Without
the regulatory restrictions of a commercial bank, Firm A is able to enhance its loan offerings
and offer more desirable products to their customers than a typical commercial bank.
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They are currently targeting those small and mid-sized firms which do not have efficient access
to the capital markets, as they view this potential client base as most profitable. Developers with
efficient access directly to the capital markets are able to obtain superior terms than Firm A is
willing to provide at this time. The market for their product is large, and as they create greater
name recognition, their hope is to increase market share as well.
The construction loans are funded through securitizable long term financing, placed in escrow
for disbursement as approved by Firm A. After the completion of construction and an allotted
time for lease-up, the loans are included in a CMBS issuance. Securitization allows Firm A to
move the seasoned loans off its books and frees up cash for subsequent investments. Their
desire is to be perceived in the market as offering the flexibility of a relationship lender with the
pricing efficiency and execution of Wall Street.
Source of Funds
Firm A finances their construction lending activities through an arrangement with the parent
company which funds Firm A's projects at the parent companies cost of funds.
Issues Relating to Literature Review
Firm A is very conscious of the value of relationships in construction lending. As reviewed in
Diamond (1989) developers who have acquired good reputations are more likely to require less
monitoring, since the internal value of their reputation then exceeds the value of taking in risky
over to safe projects. Firm A focuses on relationship building to increase their market share.
By insisting on close monitoring by Firm A's internal site inspection team, Firm A is assisting
developers with favorable track records establish sufficient track records so that monitoring can
be reduced in future transactions, both increasing borrower reputation and decreasing Firm A's
expenses
Firm A chooses to allow its construction borrowers to obtain permanent financing elsewhere,
though the construction pricing increases for such an arrangement. This allows competitive
screening on the part of developers, Beaudry (1995), though Firm A anticipates that because of
their informed position, they hold an advantage over third party providers of permanent
financing and expect to obtain a majority of the take-out commitments. They have structured
their construction loan group to be profitable, and are unwilling to utilize the project as a loss
leader for securitization.
As discussed in Rajan (1992), the benefits of informed over arm's-length lending are numerous.
Firm A effectively locks the borrower into the relationship due their acquired information
advantage. Recognizing the adage, a rising tide lifts all boats, and a receding tide lower s them
just as quickly, Firm A has chosen to utilize the information acquired during construction to
make informed permanent loan decisions. Therefore, while (Shleifer 1992) liquidation values
tend to reflect general industry trends, Firm A relies on its internal underwriters to navigate their
way through financial distress. This belief is founded in their opinion that they should know the
asset as well as any other third party, so why should they give the profitable take-out financing
to an arm's-length lender instead of internalizing the risks they know so well.
Summary of Firm A
Firm A has established a program to provide capital to reputable developers for new
construction projects which could be utilized as a model for other Wall Street firms desirous of
entering into this line of business. They have addressed issues of moral hazard and arm's-length
lending by competing aggressively with regional commercial banks on their own terms, and
created an in-house professional site inspection team with structural engineering, valuation and
construction expertise. Relationships were part of the impetus which drove Firm A to create
the ability to fund construction projects, they initially began funding construction projects for
existing firm clients as a way of strengthening relationships. Monitoring reduces moral hazard,
and Firm A stresses their ability to conduct site inspections to avert funding high risk
developments and provide to expert development feasibility projections. Firm A has also
chosen to invest the necessary resources to become an informed lender, avoiding the pitfalls of
arm's-length lending. They remain closely tied to developing industry trends, changing lending
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criteria as specific markets and product types demand. They avoid being subject to competitive
screening by borrowers since they do not tie their pricing to the permanent end loan. By
utilizing construction lending as a stand-alone product, they avoid the dangers of providing such
funds as a loss leader to obtain securitizable permanent loans. While they actively solicit
permanent financing opportunities from the developers, they avoid the inherent risks of a
privately informed borrower questionably/technically defaulting and obtaining take-out
financing from another source, once the project has been stabilized and the risks reduced.
Overall, Firm A has created a lending program which rivals the commercial banks, their primary
competition. I expect that other Wall Street firms desirous of entering the lucrative
construction lending business will duplicate the efforts of Firm A as the program gains more
recognition from the development community.
Chapter 4
CASE II - FIRM B
Firm B has approached construction financing as an extended product line for their interim
finance group, which typically seeks out $20 - $500 million portfolio financing transactions.
They are currently focusing on providing construction financing in two areas of development,
retail and hospitality. Fully leased "Big Box" and factory outlet centers owned and operated by
established industry leaders area their preferred retail projects. In the hospitality industry, they
are expecting to provide over $300 million for new construction before the end of 1998. They
entered the hospitality construction business just last year, as part of a competitive bidding
contest, and are looking to increase their presence in this very competitive field. While Firm B
sees some promise for FASITs as a vehicle for construction lending by the public capital
players, they remain cautiously optimistic about this new products viability, instead choosing to
grow their existing construction lending business to other product sectors. In addition, they are
very concerned about rising prices for construction materials and shortages of labor, akin to the
indicators of past overbuilding, and remain watchful for trends indicating overbuilding.
Construction Lending Program
A typical loan facility is as follows:
HOSPITALITY - Franchiser Sponsored
Minimum Debt Service Coverage Ratio: None
Maximum Loan to Value: 75% of cost
Minimum Equity on Cost Basis: 25%
Spreads (over comparable term LIBOR): 355 bps (participating interest with Franchiser)
Loan Size: $6 million maximum per property. Standardized lending program provides
financing at 75% of costs.
Loan Term: Three year mini-perm provides construction and stabilization period.
Fees: 1.5% up front to Firm B; Additional administrative fee during construction.
Additional 2% fee charged if borrower does not accept Firm B's permanent
financing offer.
Lien Status: First mortgage only
Recourse: Completion, repayment and environmental guarantees during construction
period form business entity and individual. Franchiser provides credit
enhancing guaranty of debt, and retains option to purchase loan if borrower
goes into default.
Prepayment: Allowed at any point, subject to breakage costs
Escrow: Required for real estate taxes and insurance
Minimum Underwriting Actual vacancy.
Vacancy:
Minimum Management 5% of Effective Gross Income
Fee:
Tenant Improvement N/A
and Leasing
Commissions:
Developer Experienced in product type and geographic area, good reputation verifiable
Qualifications: by bank references
Guarantor Requirements: Acceptability by Franchiser.
Firm B's hospitality construction program was created to obtain suitable individual loans for
securitization, to bolster their CMBS program. The above program is designed to create
homogeneous permanent financing facilities which can be securitized as sufficient product is
written, they penalize the developers with a 2% fee should a developer choose to obtain
permanent financing elsewhere. They won a competitive bidding process that took eight
months to complete. This program is sponsored by a major U.S. public company for its
franchisees. Firm B provides 75% of the construction costs, at a spread over LIBOR of +355
bps. Personal and entity guaranties are required, and Firm B further looks for credit support in
the way of personal guarantors from the entity's limited partners if available.
Firm B has not dedicated sufficient resource to this program to run it in-house, therefore, they
rely on a variety of agents to carry out the underwriting and servicing. By utilizing a third party
to agent to underwrite the credit initially, with Firm B's commitment to assume the loan they
eliminate the need for additional staff. Existing members of the firm monitor the agents
activities. Once the loan has closed, another third party, this time a regional commercial bank,
assumes the servicing responsibilities, including construction requisitions. A separate party, is
contracted to perform monthly site inspections to closely monitor each borrower's progress.
Upon completion of construction, and stabilization of occupancy, a national hotel consulting
firm is hired to perform a final valuation. This allows the developer/owner to lever up his
property based upon the economics of the specific project. The non-recourse permanent loan
is then offered to the developer based upon this appraisal. Should the borrower choose not to
accept Firm B's offer (made under provisions agreed upon at inception of the construction
financing), a 2% exit fee is charged to the borrower at the maturity of the three year mini-perm
term.
Credit enhancement on all loans in this program is obtained through a corporate guarantee
provided by franchiser. The franchiser, in compensation for providing the guaranty, receives a
participating interest in the arbitrage between Firm B's borrowing rate and the developers pay
rate. The franchiser also retains an option to purchase any borrowers defaulted loan at face
value. After construction, Firm B's experience with the rating agencies has been their
requirement of a minimum of twelve months to establish a suitable operating track record to
obtain a sufficient level of comfort to place the loan in a CMBS issue.
This program has been well received by the hotel developer/owners due to industry lending
restrictions which have made it difficult for developers to obtain leverage above 66% of costs.
Strategic Decisions
At the present time, Firm B does not feel there is sufficient volume to justify staffing an internal
department with construction lending expertise. They are content to utilize third party, for fee,
agents with established construction lending expertise to administer the loan process. However,
they do recognize the higher returns provide by construction lending, and are prepared to
expand their commitment beyond the present retail and hospitality when economic factors
support. At the present, they look at their program as an addition to their conduit program for
loan securitizations. CMBS is a product which Firm B intends to increase their involvement in.
The alliance with a major hotel franchiser provides Firm B with the first right of refusal on
permanent financing, and their risk in substantially mitigated by the franchiser's guaranty of its
franchisee's. Firm B also wants to position themselves to be prepared to take advantage of
some promising opportunities under new FASIT opportunities, if they perceive adequate
demand to support such activity. By offering their current program, they are "testing the
waters" and determining their ability to conduct the business through select agents.
Source of Funds
Due to the strong credit enhancement provided by the franchiser, Firm B is able to borrow at
LIBOR +80 bps, creating a spread of 275 bps on the construction facilities.
Issues Relating to Literature Review
Firm B's primary construction lending program seeks to avoid the inherent risks of arm's-length
lending by utilizing third party agents and relying on a corporate guaranty in one instance to
credit enhance a projected $300 million in new construction. In another lending program, they
require 100% pre-leasing. This approach to construction lending relies more on credit tenants
and investment grade guarantors than fundamentally sound real estate loan programs, but
nonetheless, they are facilitating the construction of numerous new properties across the nation.
By passing off the underwriting to agents of the corporate guarantor, Firm B is exposed to
significant moral hazard, both with the agents whose fees are earned by getting loans funded,
and with the hotel operators, not reputable developers, whose concern is more with creating a
finished project than controlling costs. Serious concerns exist over whether the
owner/developer is truly incented to avoid taking on excessive risk in the current up market,
without regard to the ultimate project viability. This becomes especially evident when one
examines the takeout financing, based upon the economics, not construction costs. Indeed, a
developer may actually obtain financing for 100% of the project's costs after project
stabilization and conversion of the debt into a non-recourse permanent loan. While this
particular arrangement may prove profitable due to the guarantors strength, in looking to
acquire new clients and grow the construction lending business to other product types Firm B
would be wise to revisit fundamental lending standards prior to expanding into new ventures
which may not provide the same investment grade guarantor.
Monitoring to avoid allowing developers to select risky projects, a classic moral hazard, is
performed by third party agents for fee. This arrangement forces Firm B into even more of an
arm's-length relationship with the entity spending their funds. Neral (1992) found the hallmark
of reputation building, a key to avoiding a borrower's acceptance of risky projects, is the
willingness of an individual to give up short term gains to try to favorably influence a long term
relationship.. Firm B's program does nothing to establish a relationship with the developer,
instead, it gives incentive to the developer to take advantage of Firm B at the end of this rather
short term relationship. Diamond (1996) does provide a solid justification of Firm B's program
when viewed from the prospective of the inefficient nature of liquidation. By obtaining what
amounts to a moneyed partner, the investment grade guarantor who commits to purchasing the
loan if it goes into default, Firm B forestalls liquidation and its problematic enforcement.
Instead of being forced to monitor, Firm B is allowed to utilize arm's-length lending and
minimal information gathering. They also employ non-optimal standard debt contracts, Boyd
(1994) which allows minimal monitoring. This program is clearly dependent on the credit
strength of the franchiser, and as such, represents Wall Streets adaptation of traditional
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construction financing to the public markets demand for liquidity in a transaction oriented
environment.
Compare and Contrast with Firm A
Firm A
Reputation
Monitoring
Moral Hazard
Relationship
Informed vs.
Am's-Length
Liquidity &
Leverage
Competitive
Screening
Firm B
Firm A has developed a lending program targeted to attract a much wider audience than Firm
B's program. Firm A is seeking stronger growth than Firm B, which is still testing the apparatus
they engineered to facilitate construction while limiting their exposure to the risks of
construction lending. While Firm A is very reliant on a borrower's reputation and perceived
ability to properly manage the completed project as a long term holder of the asset, Firm B
seeks to fill the demand for construction financing by obtaining a corporate guaranty which
provides them with investment grade security and construction loan pricing.
Firm A attempts to price the risk in accordance with their borrower's reputation and abilities,
Firm B prices their debt over 100 bps above Firm A, though the product types differ and Firm
Very Important Borrower reputation incidental,
Rely on Franchiser/Guarantor
Internal Staff, Very Important Third Party Agents
Minimized Hazard exists with both agents
and borrowers
Very Important Ignored, except with
Franchiser/ Guarantor
Informed Lender, Arm's-Length
demands private information Relies on third-party agents with
possible mis-aligned incentives
Follows market conditions Relies upon Franchiser
closely, prices loans to account Guarantor to avoid market
for risk downturns
Firm prices loans to fully support Firm charges 2% fee to utilize
stand alone product third party permanent financing
B does price their loans more aggressively than other providers of hospitality construction
loans, yet incurs only the risk of default associated with an investment grade corporate entity.
The loan sizes involved in the two programs also varies substantially. Firm A rejects most
proposals below $5 million, while Firm B limits their facilities to a maximum of $6 million.
Firm A's approach has been to establish the necessary internal expertise to administer their
loans, Firm B relies upon third party agents to perform the majority of the underwriting, lending
an servicing functions.
A side observation relates to the two firms view of their role in the process. Firm A is
aggressively pursuing new opportunities to meet the needs of their existing clients, while
creating additional permanent loans to take advantage of the publics voracious appetite for real
estate securities. Firm B has identified a relatively low risk opportunity to provide high yielding
construction financing. While both firms are looking to increase the amount of product
available for their individual mortgage securitization programs, they are looking in very different
places.
Chapter 5
CASE III - FIRM C
Firm C's entrance into construction lending was motivated by their desire to procure
commitments for permanent financing which could be used for future CMBS issuance. After
establishing an in-house permanent loan department, Firm C expanded their roles to allow for
construction lending also. They are limiting the product to established developers, who for
various reasons are not able to obtain commercial bank financing on a particular project. They
do not attempt to compete directly with banks for construction loan placement, preferring
instead to provide take-out financing by working in conjunction with banks. Firm C does
construction lending primarily for well established developers who have large, special needs,
projects. They also offer the ability to obtain large (>$100 million) facilities without the typical
delay of syndications or participations.
Construction Lending Program
Firm C's loan product is targeted toward ventures likely to culminate in stable cash flow
properties which can be quickly securitized. Hospitality, retail and office are their preferred
product choices, and the construction loan is closely tied to the take-out facility. Construction
financing is not provided to borrowers who are unwilling to commit to utilizing Firm C's
permanent financing facilities. A typical loan facility is structured as follows:
OFFICE BUILDINGS - Multi Tenanted
Minimum Debt Service Coverage Ratio: No Minimum, though LTV determines ratio
Maximum Loan to Value: 80% of cost
Minimum Equity on Cost Basis: 20%
Spreads (over comparable term LIBOR): 250 bps
Loan Size: $15 - $100 million, exceptions over $100 million are made on a case-by-case
basis.
Loan Term: Automatically rolls into stabilization and then permanent facility upon
completion and adequate seasoning for rating agencies.
Fees: 1.5% - 2.0% up front to Firm C; Additional administrative fee during
construction varies with project complexity
Lien Status: First mortgage only
Recourse: Completion and Environmental guarantees during construction period;
Completion guarantee may be released upon completion; Environmental
guarantees remain in place throughout the term of the loan.
Prepayment: Not allowed during construction. Fee required for lower use of permanent
loan funds than originally requested. Yield maintenance fees imposed on
prepayment of permanent loan financing.
Escrow: May be required at Firm A's determination for real estate taxes, tenant
improvement and insurance
Minimum Underwriting Actual vacancy, if any
Vacancy:
Minimum Management Developer's fees are earned ("Success Fee") at predetermined benchmarks,
Fee: significant hold-back paid on successful completion
Tenant Improvement Included in loan budget per lease requirements. Escrow or loan holdback
and Leasing may be required at lender's determination
Commissions:
Developer Experienced in product type and geographic area, good reputation verifiable
Qualifications: by bank references. Past digressions preclude borrowers from obtaining
funds from Firm A
Guarantor Requirements: Borrower, principal and limited partner guarantees required, reduction of
liability earned with C of 0, and further reduced as DSC increases to required
permanent financing level. Guarantors required to maintain minimum level
of Net Worth and prohibited from transferring assets.
Firm C's typical office and retail construction loans are made at a 75% loan to cost ratio.
Hospitality loans are considered at 65 - 75% loan to cost. Credit enhancement is required to
receive the higher debt level commitments. Speculative development is considered only on very
conservative terms, such as 50% of shell costs. It is possible, however, for developers to
provide additional collateral to obtain higher loan to cost funding commitments for the
financing of speculative projects.
Firm C's loan facilities differ from their competitors in that all documentation is completed at
closing; including construction, stabilization and permanent financing. The loan converts
through each stage upon meeting prescribed hurdles. The construction loan floats over LIBOR
by approximately 250 bps. This is a relatively low spread considering the loans were likely
turned down initially by a commercial bank and represent greater credit risk than Firms A and
B. The stabilization period allows the loan to season to meet rating agency requirements, and
floats over LIBOR at approximately 200 bps (term required for seasoning to satisfy rating
agencies are typically 6-12 months for office and retail projects, and up to 24 months for hotels),
permanent financing converts to fixed rates at the time of conversion. Interest rate locks may
be purchased to lock the rates in advance. Firm C will also consider resizing their permanent
loan to 90% of the construction costs after stabilization.
Closing fees are 1.5 to 2 points, payable at closing and additional expenses incurred by Firm C
in monitoring the requisition process are paid directly by the borrower. These loans are initially
full recourse, though the guarantors are allowed to earn off ±50% with Certificate of
Occupancy, more at 1.0x DSC and at 1.125x - 1.2x DSC the permanent loan becomes non-
recourse.
Firm C also provides forward commitment take-outs for developers who obtain construction
financing through other sources. Their pricing is dependent on the construction lenders terms.
Firm C is able to offer a better priced commitment for one stop shopping at Firm C, since all
tri-party agreements are avoided in these situations. Otherwise, permanent loan pricing is
dependent on the terms of tale-out, a higher rate is required if the construction lender requires a
take-out at Certificate of Occupancy, and a much lower rate is locked in with commitment for
take-out at 1.25x DSC.
As an alternative to traditional debt relationships, Firm C also provides participating equity
investments with a preferred return of LIBOR+500 bps, on a 60 month amortization schedule.
All cash flow is directed into a lock-box arrangement and the borrower is removed from
accessing cash flow until the equity portion of Firm C's investment has been repaid. Their
preferred deal size is $50 million, though loans above $100 million are considered on a case by
case basis. Loans below $15-20 million are not desired unless they done in combination with
other projects which are anticipated to aggregate over their $50 million target.
Other covenants include full recourse across all construction loan product types, standard carve-
outs, prepayment not allowed, and a substantial fee is charged to developers who use a lower
amount of permanent financing than originally requested. A majority of the typical
development fees are deemed "success fees," and as such are paid at the conclusion of the
project.
Strategic Decisions
Firm C states that they are not attempting to compete with commercial banks for construction
loans. Rather, they offer construction facilities to reputable borrowers who are unable to
borrower from such traditional lenders, usually due to the specific projects dynamics. Their
ultimate goal is to obtain suitable mortgages for inclusion in CMBS issuance's, this pipeline is
merely a minor supplement for their conduit program and is not intended to become a major
product line.
Firm C doesn't lend to merchant builders, as they generally want borrowers who intend to hold
properties in their portfolio. However, they will consider allowing merchant builders to sell the
completed property to another entity and assume the permanent mortgage in pre-approved
circumstances. This most often happens when a REIT wants a building built by a third party,
but doesn't want to carry enough permanent debt after purchase to support Firm A's CMBS
desires.
Source of Funds
Firm C chooses to lend off its balance sheet, and feels that pricing slightly above commercial
bank rates provides sufficient spreads to justify continued activity in this market sector.
Issues Relating to Literature Review
The construction lending program Firm C has established deviates from the traditional
commercial bank model. As noted in the Chapter 2 literature review, relationships and
reputation have long provided lenders protection from adverse selection and incented
borrowers to avoid moral hazard issues. By providing what is effectively arm's-length
construction financing, Firm C has circumvented established practices. They believe that this is
compensated for through their stringent equity and guarantor requirements, along with a careful
borrower selection process. Reputation is verified with established commercial banks which
have provided credit to the borrower in the past. Monitoring is minimized, as Firm C relies on
the value of reputation to mitigate a developers willingness to engage in risky projects.
In contrast to the literature, Firm C attempts to account for the inherent risks associated with
lending to borrowers unable to garner conventional bank financing by retaining developer fees,
and paying them out later in the process as "success fees." This invites borrowers to select
higher risk projects when reputation is not sufficient to restrain such activities. As noted in
Diamond (1991), in periods of high anticipated future interest rates or low present or future
anticipated economywide profitability, reputation factors becomes less able to predict a
developers selection of safe projects over risky ones. In Calem (1993) the risks of this argument
during construction is mitigated when sufficient equity is at stake, though Firm C's 90% LTV
permanent takeout loans fall short of providing the stability suggested by Calem, and equity in
additional pledged collateral may not provide adequate coverage in times of distress.
The arm's-length nature of Firm C's lending relationships also reduces the effectiveness of
relationship lending, Berlin (1996). Information held by an informed lender, who monitors
closely, becomes a valuable tool in decisions about continuing a project as conditions change.
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With securitization of permanent loans Firm C's preferred exit strategy, the value of relationship
lending is weakened when previous facilities lack the flexibility a lend and hold lender would
have to work with a firm in financial distress. Moral hazards for the borrowers are also
prevalent, as they are well aware that Firm C is most interested in completing the project, not in
monitoring costs. Without a finished product, Firm C loses its exit strategy. Shleifer & Vishny
(1992) highlight the concerns of plummeting property values when general market conditions
deteriorate, Firm C does not retain an ability to be flexible their previous facilities are dictated by
REMIC after securitization. Firm C does, however, prevent a borrower with private
information from recontracting, Beaudry (1995). This allows Firm C to enjoy a competitive
advantage over those lenders who have not tied up the permanent loan facility.
Compare and Contrast with Firms A and B
Firm A
Reputation
Monitoring
Moral
Hazard
Relationship
Informed vs.
Arm's-
Length
Liquidity &
Leverage
Competitive
Screening
Firm B Firm C
Very Important Borrower reputation Important
incidental, Rely on
Franchiser/ Guarantor
Very Important, Dedicated Third Party Agents Moderately Important,
Internal Staff Utilize Loan Officers
Minimized Hazard with both Hazard exists with
agents and borrowers borrowers
Very Important Ignored, except with Largely Ignored
Franchiser/Guarantor
Informed Lender, Arm's-Length Arm's-Length
demands private Relies on third-party
information agents with possible
mis-aligned incentives
Follows market conditions Relies upon Franchiser Rely on Completion and
closely, prices loans to Guarantor to avoid Securitization to Avoid
account for risk market downturns Exposure
Firm prices loans to fully Firm charges 2% fee to Require Borrower to
support stand alone utilize third party Sign Permanent Loan at
product permanent financing Initial Funding of
Construction
There exists significant differences among the three firms in both their approach to and execution
of construction lending. Firm A is attempting to build highly competitive program, while remaining
cognizant of the relevant lessons to be garnered from those institutions which have been involved
in the industry its since inception. They have created a model program, complete with all the
necessary checks and balances to ensure success. Firm B has found an arbitrage opportunity,
trading construction loan pricing against investment grade guarantor risk, their exposure to risk is
primarily the use of third party agents and a inordinate reliance on the contractual security of a
guaranty. Firm C simply designed a vehicle to create permanent end loans to feed a growing CMBS
machine. They are taking on substantial risks without adequate pricing, ignoring almost all of the
established conventions of prudent lending. Firm C is currently relying on slightly above market
pricing (but not fully compensating for the increased risk), retention of developers fees and
substantial volume to compensate for their arm's-length approach to construction lending.
Firm C has positioned itself to become a potentially indiscriminate provider of construction
financing to developers building major projects, a very risky prospect.
In summary, reputation is viewed as extremely important by Firm A, desirable by Firm C, and Firm
B ignores developer reputation, instead relying upon a third party guarantor's reputation and
creditworthiness.
Monitoring by Firm C is minimal. Firm B has contracted monitoring to third party agents with
apparent conflicts of interest (between Firm B and its guarantor). Firm A has staffed a team of site
inspectors with seasoned construction professionals.
Moral hazard for the developers is highest in Firm B's program, where the operators have the least
at stake in the event of failure and much to gain from a successful risky project. Firm A avoids
developers engaging in risky actions by strict monitoring. Firm C relies more on reputation of the
developers, who are selected on a basis of having established reputations high enough to incite
them to avoid engaging in risky behavior over safe projects, though their projects are inherently
risky given that they are first rejected by local informed lenders prior to receiving consideration by
Firm C.
Relationship lending is practiced by Firm A, as they are attempting to increase both construction
and CMBS business lines through enhanced services for their current customers. Firm C does not
seek to establish relationships, rather they encourage commercial banks to work with them to
provide end loans. When a project does not receive commercial bank construction financing, Firm
C reviews the project to determine if the end product will fit into their program. Firm B has
established a relationship with a franchiser who provides strong credit support; however, this does
not resolve the individual developers enticement to enter into risky projects and raises concern over
the possibility of overbuilding as developers seek to create rooms for projected demand instead of
meeting current demand.
Firm A acts much like a typical informed commercial bank in carrying out the construction lending
process, they have staffed up internally to address the operational issues confronting an informed
lender. Firm B chooses to utilize established construction lending firms as agents, though this raises
an additional aspect of moral hazard, that is, the agents fee is contingent on Firm B continuing to
fund additional projects, not on the individual projects economic prospects. Firm C acts as an
arm's-length lender; though they do perform a nominal amount of due diligence on a project by
project basis. They rely more on diversification through large numbers of loans than carefully
selecting individual projects which warranted funding, a very disconcerting practice.
Firms B and C are extremely insistent that take out financing be tied to any advance of construction
funds. Firm A provides construction financing as a profit center. All three firms have entered into
construction lending as a vehicle to obtain additional product for their loan securitization
departments, indeed, CMBS appears to be the driving force behind all their real estate debt
activities. This allows competitive screening only for developers of Firm A, as prohibitive fees are
established to obtain funds from either Firm B or C.
Firm A has clearly established a premium loan program. Firm B has entered into a specialized
situation, and must be careful to not expand their program without investment grade guarantors.
Firm C has established a very risky venture, and one that will likely create significant financial
distress in the next real estate downturn if they continue along their present course.
Chapter 6
FINANCING ALTERNATIVES WHEN DEBT GETS TOO RESTRICTIVE
Just three years ago, the cost to utilize traditional construction financing was prohibitively
expensive. Lenders were requiring onerous covenants and providing little incentive to
developers to construct new product, despite demand by corporate clients which justified
development, nevertheless, new properties continued to emerge in select markets. When
traditional debt is too expensive, developers who have good projects find alternative means to
produce them. Corporations may borrow against their corporate credit worthiness (synthetic
leasing) and merchant builders may utilize internal financing to fill perceived opportunities that
traditional financing sources will not yet support. Opportunity funds have been created to
enable builders to engage in construction without traditional debt financing, though this entails a
significant equity sharing arrangement with the provider of the funds. The following three
financing alternatives all affect Wall Street by removing the most desirable clients from their
prospective list of borrowers, thus resulting in a riskier pool from which to start their ventures
into construction financing.
Opportunity Funds
Firms like Starwood Mezzanine Investors, Goldman Sachs' Whitehall and the Tiger funds
continually seek out opportunities within the real estate world. Recently found purchasing
properties at discounted rates due to an overall lack of capital in the market, these market
leaders are now segueing into being hedge funds, finding arbitrages in the market and taking
advantage of continued market inefficiencies. They are also providing capital for
development in exchange for the right to take on securitizable debt, preferred returns on
investment and equity sharing in the completed project. This has enabled select developers
without private access to capital to develop speculative facilities before general market
conditions have rebounded, putting them first in line to offer new space as markets eventually
absorb the existing supply. This should be watched closely as Wall Street provides debt
capital to developers who may be behind the development curve, supplying product the meet
needs which are more quickly met by the opportunity funds equity plays.
Internal Financing
Some major regional and national developers still see no reason to utilize borrowed proceeds
for construction or redevelopment projects. They find debt funding constraints unnecessarily
inflate the costs of development, and pre-leasing requirements further limit their potential to
capitalize on perceived future rent increases. As an example, a Boston area developer's three
projects, a pure speculative 125,000 square foot suburban office building and two hotel
expansion projects are being funded entirely through the companies internal cash reserves.
While he does anticipate utilizing long term non-recourse debt upon completion, his leverage
projections are well below established industry standards. He remains concerned over the local
banks recent aggressive attempts to lend funds to his firm for new development, feeling that
they may have too quickly forgotten the repercussions of their past flurry. Access to sufficient
internal financing can provide a developer with an opportunity to engage in market timing,
completing speculative space to meet anticipated demand rather than building in competition
with other developers to meet pre-existing needs which may or may not exist upon building
completion. This also raises concern of adverse selection further reducing borrower quality.
Synthetic Leases
Synthetic leases allow credit worthy corporations to finance construction of corporate facilities
at rates based on their company credit rating rather than the specific projects feasibility. The
leases, in which a capital source provides the funding for the construction or acquisition of real
estate to be utilized by, and leased to, a corporate user, have grown in popularity due to their
ability to qualify as an operating lease for financial accounting purposes while being treated as a
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financing transaction for federal tax purposes. A special purpose entity (SPE) is created to book
a loan, the proceeds of which are used to finance the construction of the subject real estate. A
short term lease is then entered into between the lessee and the SPE, at the end of which the
lessee must make a balloon payment to essentially repay nearly al of the project cost. The
synthetic lease achieves off balance sheet treatment for the tenant on the asset being financed,
together with the retention of tax benefits associated with ownership. The IRS, as well as the
bankruptcy courts, look at the substance over form when reviewing these transactions to
conclude that the lessee is actually the beneficial owner through a conditional sale. The IRS has
deemed that all the risks, rewards and responsibilities reside with the lessee. The opposite is
true for GAAP purposes as the form over substance argument prevails and the financing is
treated as an operating lease. The SPE owner of record must make a 3% equity investment that
is deemed at risk throughout the lease term, the balance of the project cost is financed with
debt, typically comprised of two tranches: the A tranche, equal to 85% of project cost, and the B
tranche, equal to 12% of project cost. The interest only can float over LIBOR or can be fixed
using an interest rate swap. The lease is completely triple net, with the tenant fully responsible
for operating and managing the asset. The lease appears more like a medium term revolving
credit arrangement than a typical lease, with protections in place similar to a normal commercial
loan to a high credit company. If the lessee does not maintain as investment grade credit,
collateral is provided to give the lender comfort that the loan s will be repaid. The compelling
benefits of a synthetic lease are that; the tenant receives the same tax benefits from depreciation
as would an owner, the tenant obtains 100% of the properties appreciation, the loan can be
priced approximately 200-300 basis points below a conventional financing since risk-based real
estate costs are avoided, the lessee avoids depreciation for financial accounting purposes thereby
improving reported earnings and improving debt equity ratios, profit potential for the developer
is limited and all project costs can be financed (real property, personal property and soft costs.)
The risks for the lessee in this transaction occur upon lease termination, at which time the lessee
can purchase the property for an amount equaling the original cost, or if the firm wishes to
abandon the facility, they can leave with a minimum rental payment which makes the payments
required under the lease equal 89.9% of original project costs.
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These three alternatives allow corporate users to construct new facilities regardless of the state
of the existing real estate market. This tax driven advantage will likely continue to be utilized as
the industry becomes more familiar wit the intricate tax issues, until either the IRS or
accountants, for GAAP purposes, redefine their view of the financial engineering instruments.
Implications
Financing commercial real estate is a highly competitive business. The above alternatives to
traditional construction financing allow builders and users of commercial space to avoid the
traditional debt markets when debt is deemed to restrictive. It should be recognized that these
financing sources will likely satisfy the financing needs of the upper tier of developers, further
reducing the average quality of borrowers seeking financing from traditional sources. Together,
these three financing vehicles make up only a small fraction of ongoing development, but they
create significant changes in the overall characteristics of those demanding financing by
reducing the availability of premier borrowers. This adverse selection problem makes the
process of screening and monitoring that much more critical.
Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
Each of the three subject public market firms has made the strategic decision to enter into
financing construction for the primary purpose of obtaining a larger share of the debt
securitization market. Despite this similarity in motivation, they are offering markedly different
products, targeted at different sectors of the development community. The cases identify
current practices which do not suggest we are progressing headlong into another construction
boom, although the aversion of some Wall Street Firms to utilize the proven safety nets
provided through relationship lending, monitoring and removal of moral hazards concerns me
greatly. This, coupled with the sheer volume of capital the public markets make available,
suggests that we must carefully watch how Wall Street structures its lending programs. Though
as these new lending initiatives mature, there remains great promise that the public scrutiny
provided by Wall Street in both construction and permanent lending can lower the volatility of
real estate supply and pricing.
The primary distinction between the current commercial bank construction lending programs
and Wall Streets comes down to commercial bank's risk based capital constraints. Banks simply
cannot compete on spreads for construction loans if Wall Street relaxes their lending
requirements and begins to offer higher leverage ratios. While Wall Street has not taken
advantage of this "opportunity," there remains a clear danger that underwriting standards could
deteriorate as the fee income becomes more attractive to Wall Street. At the present time there
is little indication that Wall Street is prepared to fuel a speculative building boom along the lines
of the 1980s debacle. However, their reluctance to implement programs which require strict
adherence to the lessons of the 1980s, namely, reputation, monitoring and relationship lending
raises serious concerns over their willingness to provide restraint in feeding the increasing
demand for construction financing. Wall Street itself must be monitored to understand how it
responds in an effort feed it's :securitization machine."
Product Strategy Adverse Selection Monitoring
Firm A Relationship enhancing Compete directly with In house staff performs
service, build firm's commercial banks, nationwide monitoring
perception as for full service reputation and monitoring through site inspections
while increasing market utilized to reduce exposure. and requisition
presence in CMBS. holdbacks.
Firm B Opportunistic venture which Acknowledge risk on Utilize 3rd party Agents
is hoped to produce model individual deals, mitigated by with extensive expertise,
for future source of short Franchiser Guaranty and additional moral hazard
term, high yield instruments; small individual loan limits. incurred in process.
and feed CMBS.
Firm C Obtain increased share of Mitigate risk with higher Limited monitoring
future commercial loans pricing, this exacerbates utilized, rely on
available for securitization. problem and worsens the reputation to nuitigate.
"lemon's problem" it was
designed to correct
Overall, I believe that it is feasible to provide public capital to construction lending if the firm is
willing to invest the resources necessary to establish a satisfactory means to monitor, and
adheres to established reputation recommendations. As we currently see several firms utilizing
different methods as they enter this field, I would look for the most profitable (highest return
for least risk) venture to be quickly copied by the other Wall Street firms. I expect Wall Street to
continue their construction lending activities, and after a shakeout brought about by the next
down cycle, new Wall Street firms entering into construction finance will likely adapt and utilize
proven lending techniques, much as Firm A has done already.
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